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Abstract
We consider market players with tail-risk-seeking behaviour as exem-
plified by the S-shaped utility introduced by Kahneman and Tversky.
We argue that risk measures such as value at risk (VaR) and expected
shortfall (ES) are ineffective in constraining such players. We show that,
in many standard market models, product design aimed at utility maxi-
mization is not constrained at all by VaR or ES bounds: the maximized
utility corresponding to the optimal payoff is the same with or without ES
constraints. By contrast we show that, in reasonable markets, risk man-
agement constraints based on a second more conventional concave utility
function can reduce the maximum S-shaped utility that can be achieved
by the investor, even if the constraining utility function is only rather
modestly concave. It follows that product designs leading to unbounded
S-shaped utilities will lead to unbounded negative expected constraining
utilities when measured with such conventional utility functions. To prove
these latter results we solve a general problem of optimizing an investor
expected utility under risk management constraints where both investor
and risk manager have conventional concave utility functions, but the in-
vestor has limited liability. We illustrate our results throughout with the
example of the Black–Scholes option market. These results are particu-
larly important given the historical role of VaR and that ES was endorsed
by the Basel committee in 2012–2013.
Keywords and phrases: Optimal product design under risk constraints; value at
risk constraints; expected shortfall constraints; concave utility constraints; S-shaped
utility maximization; limited liability investors; tail risk seeking investors; effective
risk constraints; concave utility risk constraints.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider market players with tail-risk-seeking behaviour as exemplified
by the S-shaped utility introduced by Kahneman and Tversky [21]. We argue that
risk measures such as value at risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES) (also known
as conditional value at risk (CVaR) or more rarely as average value at risk (AVaR))
are ineffective in constraining such players. To illustrate this we show that, in many
familiar market models, product design aimed at utility maximization for tail-risk-
seeking market players is unaffected by ES bounds. Given that for a fixed confidence
level ES dominates VaR, the analysis under VaR constraints is completely analogous
and easier, so in the paper we focus on ES. To show this ineffective behavior, we prove
that the maximized utility corresponding to the optimal payoff in the optimization
problem is the same with or without an ES constraint. This is particularly important
in the light of the fact that ES has been officially endorsed and suggested as a risk
measure by the Basel committee in 2012-2013 [5, 6], partly for its “coherent risk
measure” properties [3, 2].
We are not the first to criticize VaR and ES. A full literature review on criticism of
VaR and ES is beyond the scope of this introduction. We recall the above-mentioned
works [3, 2], where VaR is criticized for its lack of coherence and sub-additivity more
in particular. However, ES has not been immune from criticism either. [9] for example
argues that the reliability of any backtesting procedure for ES is much lower than
that of VaR. The issue of backtestability of ES has been discussed via the elicitability
debate started in [14] in recent years, although [1] clarified several issues on the matter,
arguing that ES is backtestable, see also [25] and [12] where it is proven that the
pair formed by VaR and ES is jointly elicitable. The paper [10], working under the
framework of prequential statistics, argues that VaR has important advantages over
ES in terms of verification properties. The debate is continuing to this day.
However, our criticism here does not center on a choice between VaR and ES and
is of a different, more fundamental nature. Our criticism links directly with the use
of risk measures as an excessive risk-taking control tool, where we show that VaR
and ES clearly fail in a quite general market model. We further illustrate this failure
by specializing our result to a Black–Scholes option market setting, given that the
Black–Scholes market is a typical benchmark case.
The first part of the paper is thus a negative result on the use of expected short-
fall for curbing excessive tail-risk-seeking behaviour. The natural question is which
alternatives could work?
In the second part of the paper we introduce a possible solution. We calculate the
solution of the payoff-design optimization problem with expected utility constraints
replacing ES constraints. In this case two utilities will be involved: the investor
utility to be maximized, and the risk manager’s concave utility that will constrain the
strategy. We are able to calculate the optimal strategy in a special case corresponding
to a conventionally risk-averse investor with limited liability. We will see that in this
case risk constraints are effective in curbing excessive tail-risk-seeking behaviour under
quite modest conditions on the market and the risk manager’s utility function.
Note that it follows from the last result that in order to achieve unboundedly
positive expected utilities measured with the investor’s S-shaped utility function, the
expected utilities measured using the risk manager’s concave utility function must be
unboundedly negative.
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We now present a literature review of earlier related work1.
Utility optimization under risk measure constraints was considered earlier in [4],
who adopt a framework that is exactly the one we adopt in this paper, but only under
standard utility assumptions and no S-shaped utility in particular. In that paper it is
shown that in the case where a large loss occurs, it is an even larger loss under value
at risk based risk management. This occurs because when the constraint is binding, a
market player who is forced by the VaR constraint to reduce portfolio losses in some
states would finance these reduced losses by increasing portfolio losses in the costly
states where the terminal state price density is large. As such states already have the
lowest terminal portfolio value for the unconstrained problem, the VaR constraint ends
up fattening the left tail of the terminal portfolio distribution. This leads to increased
probability of extreme losses.
In [8] it is shown that VaR constraints play a better role when, as is done in practice,
the portfolio VaR is re-evaluated dynamically by incorporating available conditioning
information. Again, this is done under standard utility and S-shaped utility is not
considered.
Prospect theory has been studied in relation to risk measures and portfolio choice
in a series of papers by Xunyu Zhou and co-authors. We will consider primarily the
four papers [19, 29, 16, 15]. Related research is presented in [18, 28, 27, 26, 7, 20].
The first paper we consider here is the 2008 paper [19], where optimal portfolio
choice under S-shaped utility and probability distorsions is considered and solved. This
is done without a risk constraint, though, but essentially under a budget constraint and
at times a no-bankruptcy constraint, meaning a positive terminal value. Techniques
include essentially what we call X-rearrangements here in our paper and connections
with the classic theory of re-arrangements and inequalities by Hardy and Littlewood
is done explicitly in the 2010 paper [29].
The 2011 paper [16] generalizes and abstracts the approach in [19], addressing a
variety of models, leading to the “quantile formulation”. It solves a general problem of
utility maximization, including S-shaped utility with probability distorsion and under
a budget constraint but no risk constraint. This 2011 paper uses law invariance as
we do here and adopts similar assumptions and techniques. In particular, it is found
that the optimal terminal payment is anti-comonotonic with the pricing kernel. If one
ignores the risk management constraint, the 2011 paper effectively contains a proof of
our Theorem 3.1 below in a more general setting.2 However, we find that although
the techniques and the discussion in that paper anticipate many of the techniques and
ideas we use here, again portfolio choice based on S-shaped utility maximization under
a value at risk or expected shortfall constraint is not addressed, as further confirmed
by the five motivating models in [16].
The 2015 paper [15] considers the problem of miminizing a risk measure (typically
generalizations of weighted Value at Risk, WVaR) under a minimum performance
constraint, or on optimizing mean risk (as opposed to expected utility). There are
clear connections with our paper. The closest we get, it seems to us, is in Section 7.2
of [15] where VaR constraints are used but expected utility is not considered as the
objective to be maximized, as the expected return or mean risk is maximized instead.
We note that Section 7.2 of [15] is presented as a contribution to the debate on portfolio
1Following a presentation of the first version of this paper (published online on November
3, 2017) at Columbia University in New York on November 29, 2017, we learned that extensive
work had been done previously on related themes that partly overlaps with this paper.
2We had developed our proof independently and found out later that a similar proof for the
problem without risk constraint had been published earlier in [16] in a more general setting.
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choice under risk constraints as for example in the above-mentioned earlier paper [8],
although while [8] does consider expected (but not S-shaped) utility, [15] does not do
so in Section 7.2.
We remain confident that optimal portfolio choice under s-shaped utility and
VaR/ES constraints or concave utility risk constraints remains therefore an origi-
nal problem, although the above papers represent a fundamental contribution to be-
havioural finance, prospect theory, portfolio choice and risk measures, anticipating
part of our results and techniques.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce S-shaped utility and
define the notion of a tail-risk-seeking market player. We also point out that utility
has to be measured on the right variables, like the pay-packet of a trader for example
rather than simply his portfolio P&L, and that in such cases S-shaped utility does not
necessarily denote irrational behaviour.
In Section 3 we introduce the optimization problem that will be used in the paper.
We find a given market optimal payoff design (simple claim) that maximizes a function
of the claim distribution under a price constraint and a risk measurement constraint.
The risk management constraint is based on the claim probability distribution and
could be for example a limit on VaR or ES of the claim position. The solution of this
problem is given in a theorem, proved in Appendix A where we use a notion of rear-
rangement similar to that used in the Hardy and Littlewood inequality for symmetric
decreasing rearrangements, see also the earlier works [11] and [29]3. Incidentally, the
fact that we have both prices and risk measures leads us to model explicitly also the
Radon–Nykodim derivative linking the pricing measure and the physical measure.
In Section 4 we apply our optimization result to payoff design optimization under
S-shaped utility and expected shortfall risk constraints. This is the main negative
result of the paper, where we show that the expected shortfall constraint is irrelevant
in that the problem has the same optimal expected utility with or without it.
In Section 5 we apply our result in the Black Scholes market, showing the specific
calculations and entities that arise in that setting.
Section 6 starts looking at effective solutions for curbing excessive risk-seeking
behaviour that do not suffer from the ES problems. We see that an effective constraint
can be based on putting bounds on expected concave utilities. In this case the risk
constraint, based on the expected concave utility for losses, impacts the optimal payoff
design. The objective function is still based on the expected utility corresponding to
gains. We still work under an additional price/budget constraint. We also provide a
two step algorithm that allows one to compute the optimal solution via line search.
We conclude by illustrating calculations for a specific parametric choice of the utility
function and market and show that for strategies that attain infinite S-shaped investor
expected utility, the risk expected concave utility constraint is infinitely bad.
2 S-shaped utility and tail-risk-seeking behaviour
In [21], Kahneman and Tversky observed that individuals appear to have preferences
governed by an S-shaped utility function. By “S-shaped” utility Kahneman and Tver-
sky mean a number of things.
(i) They are increasing
3While we have developed the connection with the theory of Hardy and Littlewood inde-
pendently, we found out later that this had been realized earlier in [29], see also [11].
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(ii) They are strictly convex on the left
(iii) They are strictly concave on the right
(iv) They are non-differentiable at the origin
(v) They are asymmetrical: negative events are considered worse than positive events
are considered good.
A typical S-shaped utility function is shown in Figure 1. The prototypical example of
Terminal Wealth
Utility
Figure 1: An S-Shaped utility function.
S-shaped utility (see for example [13], Formula 2.9) is
u(x) = xγ1{x≥0} − λ(−x)γ1{x<0}, (1)
for a zero benchmark level, with λ > 0 and 0 < γ ≤ 1.
It is generally agreed that a rational, loss-averse, risk-averse individual should have
a utility function which is increasing and concave. Thus Kahneman and Tversky’s
result appears to give empirical evidence for the hypothesis that either individuals do
not behave rationally or that they are not risk-averse.
Alternatively one might argue that the apparent irrationality is due to failing to
fully analyse the actual returns experienced by actors. For example, a particular trader
may be interested in their pay-packet and not in the performance of their portfolios.
Thus the fact that a trader may be willing to risk enormous losses is perfectly rational:
they personally only lose their job and possibly their reputation even if they bring down
the bank they are working for. The “true” utility function of the trader should be a
function of their pay-packet. By considering only functions of the PnL of the portfolios
they manage, one is given a false impression that the traders are irrational. Similarly,
it is perfectly rational for a limited liability company to take enormous risks with other
people’s money.
Whether the cause of S-shaped utility functions is irrationality or limited liability,
there is certainly good evidence that they are a useful tool for modelling real worlds
behaviour. A regulator or risk-manager should certainly consider the possibility that
they must regulate or manage actors who behave as though governed by S-shaped
utility.
Not all of the characteristics of S-shaped utility functions are important to us in
this paper. We are primarily interested in the convexity on the left. Motivated by
Kahneman and Tversky’s original example (1), we introduce the following definition.
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Definition 2.1. An increasing function u : R −→ R (to be thought of as a utility
function) is said to be “risk-seeking in the left tail” if there exist constants N ≤ 0,
η ∈ (0, 1) and c > 0 such that:
u(x) > −c|x|η ∀x ≤ N. (2)
Similarly u is said to be “risk-averse in the right tail” if there exists N ≥ 0,
η ∈ (0, 1) and c > 0 such that
u(x) < c|x|η ∀x ≥ N. (3)
The standard pictures of “S-shaped” utility functions in the literature appear to
have these properties. Furthermore the S-shaped utility functions that would arise due
to a limited liability would be bounded below and so would certainly be risk-seeking
in the left tail.
We give a formal definition of S-shaped for the purposes of this paper.
Definition 2.2. A function u is said to be “S-shaped” if
1. u is increasing
2. u(x) ≤ 0 for x ≤ 0
3. u(x) ≥ 0 for x ≥ 0
4. For x ≥ 0, u(x) is concave.
5. u is risk-seeking in the left tail.
6. u is risk-averse in the right tail.
3 Law-invariant portfolio optimization
Let (Ω,F ,P) be a probability space and let dQ
dP be a positive random variable with∫
Ω
dQ
dP dP(ω) = 1.
We will use this model to represents a complete financial market as follows:
(i) We assume there is a fixed risk free interest rate r, assumed to be a deterministic
constant.
(ii) Given a measurable function, or random variable f , one can purchase a derivative
security with payoff at time T given by f(ω) for the price
EQ[e−rT f ] :=
∫
Ω
e−rT f(ω)
dQ
dP
(ω) dP (4)
assuming that this integral exists.
We note that the properties we require of dQ
dP allow us to define a measure dQ :=
dQ
dP dP, justifying our notation.
In convex analysis it is often convenient to allow infinite values in calculations (see
[23]). We will use the following conventions. Let us write f+ and f− for the positive
and negative parts of a measurable function f . Suppose that∫
Ω
f+(ω) dP
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is finite but ∫
Ω
f−(ω) dP
is not finite, then we will write ∫
Ω
f(ω) dP = −∞.
We can similarly define what it means for an integral to equal +∞.
We will be considering investment under cost constraints. In our model we will
assume that it is possible to purchase a derivative with payoff f(ω) whose price ac-
cording to (4) is −∞ whatever cost constraint is imposed. Assets where the cost is
+∞, or where the price is undefined, cannot be purchased.
We assume that the investor’s preferences are encoded by some function
v :M1(R)→ R
whereM1(R) is the space of probability measures on R, so that an investor will prefer
a security with payoff f over a security with payoff g iff v(Ff ) > v(Fg) (we are writing
Ff for the cumulative density function of the random variable f). Thus the investor’s
preferences are law-invariant.
We assume that the investor has a fixed budget C so that they can only purchase
securities with payoff f satisfying
−∞ ≤ EQ[e−rT f ] =
∫
Ω
e−rT f(ω)
dQ
dP
(ω)dP(ω) ≤ C.
We emphasize that if this integral is equal to −∞ the investor may purchase the
security. As we hinted above, treating infinity in this way is notationally convenient
and is standard practice in convex analysis [23]. At an intuitive level, we are simply
saying that one can always purchase an asset if one is willing to overpay.
We assume that all the other trading constraints are law-invariant. For example:
the investor may have to ensure that the minimum payoff is almost surely above
a certain level; they may be operating under ES or VaR constraints; they may be
operating under utility constraints. We model the combined constraints using a set
A ⊆M1(R) and requiring that Ff ∈ A.
In summary, our investor wishes to solve the following optimization problem:
sup
f∈L0(Ω,P)
v(Ff )
subject to a price constraint −∞ ≤
∫
Ω
e−rT f(ω)
dQ
dP
(ω) dP(ω) ≤ C
and risk management constraints Ff ∈ A ⊆M1(R).
(5)
In Appendix A we prove the following theorem which shows we may assume f
has a particular form when solving (5). Let F−1f denote generalized inverse of the
cumulative distribution function Ff defined by F
−1
f (p) := inf{x : Ff (x) ≥ p}. We
similarly write (1 − Ff )−1 for the generalized inverse of complementary cumulative
distribution function which is defined by (1− Ff )−1(p) := inf{x | 1− Ff (x) ≤ p}.
Theorem 3.1. Suppose that Ω is non-atomic then there exists a uniformly distributed
random variable U such that:
J. Armstrong & D. Brigo. Optimizing S-shaped utility & risk management 8
(i) dQ
dP = (1− F dQ
dP
)−1 ◦ U almost surely.
(ii) If f satisfies the price and risk management constraints of (5) then
ϕ(U) = F−1f ◦ U
also satisfies the constraints of (5) and is equal to f in distribution, and hence
has the same objective value as f .
4 Portfolio optimization with S-shaped utility
and expected shortfall constraints
Let u be a function which need not necessarily be either concave or increasing. Con-
sider problem (5) where the objective, v, is the expected utility for u and where we
have a single expected shortfall constraint. For a definition of value at risk and ex-
pected shortfall we refer for example to [22] or [2]. Suppose our probability model
is non-atomic, and let U be the random variable given in Theorem 3.1 and define
q = 1− F dQ
dP
, so q is a decreasing function.
By Theorem 3.1, under expected shortfall risk constraint the optimization problem
is equivalent to solving
sup
ϕ:[0,1]→R,ϕ increasing
F(ϕ) :=
∫ 1
0
u(ϕ(x)) dx (6)
subject to the price constraint
∫ 1
0
ϕ(x)q(x) dx ≤ C (7)
and the expected shortfall constraint
1
p
∫ p
0
ϕ(x) dx ≥ L. (8)
Moreover, this map preserves the objective values and the supremum. Note that
the expected shortfall representation in the left hand side of (8) comes from (3.3) in
[2].
We are now ready to state the main negative result of this paper.
Theorem 4.1 (Irrelevance of expected shortfall constraints under tail risk-seeking).
Suppose u is risk-seeking in the left tail and
lim
x→0
q(x) =∞
then the optimal value of the optimization problem (6) (7) under the ES constraint (8)
is the same as the optimal value of the unconstrained problem, supu.
Proof. We consider functions ϕ of the form:
ϕ(x) =
{
k1, if x ≥ α
k2, otherwise.
(9)
We require that 0 < α < p and k2 < k1. For functions of this form we can rewrite (6)
as:
F(ϕ) = αu(k2) + (1− α)u(k1) (10)
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and equations (7) and (8) as:
pL− (p− α)k1
α
≤ k2 ≤
C − k1
∫ 1
α
q(x) dx∫ α
0
q(x) dx.
Let us restrict ourselves further to functions where:
k2 =
pL− (p− α)k1
α
.
So long as k1 is sufficiently large, we will have k2 < k1. For such functions the ES
constraint is automatically satisfied and the budget constraint becomes:
pL− (p− α)k1 ≤ α∫ α
0
q(x) dx
(
C −
∫ 1
α
q(x) dx
)
. (11)
Taking the limit of the left hand side of (11) as α→ 0 we obtain
pL− pk1.
On the other hand the right hand side tends to zero as α→ 0 because of our assump-
tions on the function q(x). For all sufficiently large k1 we can ensure that
pL− pk1 < −1 < 0.
So for sufficiently large k1 and sufficiently small α, the budget constraint will hold.
With the chosen value for k2, our objective function can be written:
F(ϕ) = αu
(
pL− (p− α)k1
α
)
+ (1− α)u(k1)
Our constraints are now simply that 0 < α < δ and k1 > M for some values δ > 0
and M > 0.
We wish to show that for sufficiently large k1, the limit of (4) as α tends to zero
is u(k1). Let us choose constants c, N and η as given in (2). We may choose k1
sufficiently large and α sufficiently small so that the following all hold:
k1 >
2M
p
,
p
4
k1 > pL,
α <
p
2
.
It follows that
pL <
(p
2
− α
)
k1
and hence
pL < (p− α)X1 − p
2
k1 < (p− α)k1 −Mα.
Thus
pL− (p− α)k1
α
< −M
and we may conclude
u
(
pL− (p− α)k1
α
)
> −c
∣∣∣∣L− (p− α)k1α
∣∣∣∣η .
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Figure 2: Type of payoff whose limit for α→ 0 (implying k2(α) ↓ −∞) is used
to find the optimal utility value
So for sufficiently large k1 and sufficiently small α > 0 the objective function is bounded
below:
F(ϕ) ≥ −αc
∣∣∣∣pL− (p− α)k1α
∣∣∣∣η + (1− α)u(k1).
= −cα1−η|pL− (p− α)k1|η + (1− α)u(k1)
→ u(k1) as α→ 0
Hence the supremum of the objective function is bounded below by (supx u(x)) − 
for any  > 0. On the other hand it is trivial that the objective function is bounded
above by supx u(x).
We can see the type of optimal payoff from the proof. A sketch of the optimal
payoff can be deduced from Figure 2. In this figure we focus on an example with
positive k1 and negative k2 = k2(α) = k1 +p(L−k1)/α. If we assume L to be negative
then for α ↓ 0 we have k2 ↓ −∞ for any positive k1. Essentially the payoff we use is a
digital option with a very large (in absolute value) negative value k2 in a very small
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area of size α near 0, and with a much smaller positive payoff k1 in the big area [α, 1].
This is the type of payoff that satisfies the budget and expected shortfall (or VaR in
case) constraints while maximizing the expected S-shaped utility.
5 Trading simple claims in the Black–Scholes–
Merton market
In this section we will consider a investor who wishes to optimize her utility at time
T by investing in options with maturity T . This investor will follow a buy and hold
strategy, but her portfolio will be an option portfolio.
We assume that put and call options can be bought and sold at a wide variety of
strikes and so the market can be reasonably well approximated by a complete market.
In this market any European derivative whose payoff is a function of the final stock
price, otherwise known as simple contingent claim, can be bought or sold at a fixed
price.
We must choose a model for the price of these derivatives. As an example we
will consider European derivatives on a stock which follows the Black–Scholes–Merton
model. Thus we consider derivatives on the final stock price in a market where one
can trade in either zero coupon bonds with (deterministic) risk free rate r or in a
non-dividend paying stock whose price at time t, St, follows a geometric Brownian
motion under the P-measure
dSt = St(µ dt+ σ dW
P
t ), S0
with drift µ, volatility σ > 0 and initial condition S0 > 0. The process W
P
t is a
standard Brownian motion under the P probability measure.
By Ito’s formula, the log of the stock price, st = lnSt, satisfies
dst =
(
µ− 1
2
σ2
)
dt+ σ dW Pt , s0 = ln(S0).
Hence, under the P-measure, sT is normally distributed with mean s0 + (µ − 12σ2)T
and standard deviation σ
√
T . Let us write the density function explicitly:
pBSsT (x) =
1
σ
√
2piT
exp
(
− (x− (s0 + (µ−
1
2
σ2)T ))2
2σ2T
)
. (12)
The standard pricing theory in the Black–Scholes–Merton market tells us that the
price of a European derivative in this market can be computed using the discounted
Q-measure expectation of the payoff where the stock price process in the Q-measure
is
dSt = St(r dt+ σ dW
Q
t ), S0,
where now WQt is a standard Brownian motion under the measure Q.
Hence we can write down the Q-measure density function for sT
qBSsT (x) =
1
σ
√
2piT
exp
(
− (x− (s0 + (r −
1
2
σ2)T ))2
2σ2T
)
. (13)
Now let (ΩD,FD,PD) be the probability space for the final log stock price sT .
The superscript D stands for “derivatives market”. This probability space is simply
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R with probability density given by pBS and σ-field given by the Borel set. We can
define a random variable dQ
dP
D
(sT ) := q
BS(sT )/p
BS(sT ) on (Ω
D,FD,PD). Together,
dQ
dP
D
and (ΩD,FD,PD) define a market: the market of European derivatives on the
final stock price sT . For any payoff function f of sT the price of the derivative is given
by (4) so long as this integral exists and is less than ∞. This is a complete market.
Let U be the standard uniform random variable given by FsT (sT ). We calculate
F−1sT (U) = s0 + T
(
µ− σ
2
2
)
+ σ
√
TΦ−1(U)
where as usual Φ us the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal.
Using the explicit formulae for q(sT ) and p(sT ) we compute
dQ
dP
D
(U) =
q(F−1sT (U))
p(F−1sT (U))
= exp
(µ− r
2σ2
(
(µ+ r − σ2)T + 2(s0 − F−1sT (U))
))
= exp
[
µ− r
σ
(
−µ− r
σ
T
2
−
√
TΦ−1(U)
)]
where we have highlighted the role of the market price of risk µ−r
σ
. If we assume
µ > r, then this function is decreasing in U . Since U is uniform, we conclude that this
expression is equal to (1−F dQ
dP
(U))−1. We see that if µ > r then dQ
dP
D →∞ as U → 0.
If µ < r then dQ
dP
D →∞ as U → 1.
Thus European derivatives at time T in the Black–Scholes–Merton market satisfy
the assumptions of Theorem 4.1. We have the following
Corollary 5.1 (Irrelevance of expected shortfall in reducing tail-risk-seeking be-
haviour in a Black–Scholes market). In a Black–Scholes model, the expected utility
of a investor who is risk-seeking in the left tail is limited only by the supremum of her
utility function. Investors can achieve any desired expected utility below this supre-
mum by trading in the bond and a digital option. Expected shortfall constraints do not
impact the expected utility corresponding to the optimal solution.
Remark 5.2. We have assumed in our analysis that the horizon of the investment,
T1, and the ES time horizon, T2 coincide. Typically the ES time horizon is the time
one estimates could be needed to liquidate the position in a hostile market so in practice
one would have T2 < T1. However, an investor who wishes to maximize their utility
at time T1 could choose to restrict themselves to buying derivatives with maturity T2
and then holding investing the payoff in zero coupon bonds until time T1 in which case
the payoff at time T1 would be a function of the payoff at time T2.
Remark 5.3. We have illustrated our results with the Black–Scholes–Merton model
for simplicity. The key observation was that densities for pBS and qBS were normal
but with different drifts, so the ratio qBS/pBS is unbounded. Over sufficiently short
time horizons, the density of any stochastic process driven by Itoˆ equations can be well
approximated by multivariate normal distributions. This can be expressed rigorously
using asymptotic formulae for the heat kernel of a stochastic process (see for example
[17]). Thus over short time horizons one expects to find that dQ
dP will be unbounded
for any market model defined using Itoˆ calculus where the market price of risk is non-
zero. One can easily devise examples of stochastic processes which converge to a fixed
value at a future time T , so we cannot deduce that dQ
dP will be unbounded at time T .
J. Armstrong & D. Brigo. Optimizing S-shaped utility & risk management 13
Nevertheless, one expects that in a realistic market model dQ
dP will indeed be unbounded
at any time T .
6 Portfolio optimization with limited liability
and utility constraints
We saw previously important but negative results: tail-risk-seeking investors and in-
vestors who aim to maximize S-shaped utilities are not impacted by expected shortfall
constraints. While this tells us that in this context expected shortfall is not effective
in curbing excessive risk taking, what should one do instead? We have reached the
point in the paper where we can make a positive proposal for an alternative approach.
Let us return to problem (5). We suppose that the regulator is indifferent to
the outcome if the portfolio payoff is positive and imposes a risk constraint on the
expected utility of the negative part of the payoff. We specialise our analysis to the
case where the investor has limited liability and so is indifferent to the outcome if the
portfolio payoff is negative. We model this by choosing two utility functions uR and
uI representing the regulator and the investor’s utility functions respectively.
Theorem 6.1. Let uR(x) : R → R be a concave increasing function (associated with
the risk constraint utility function) equal to 0 when x ≥ 0. Let uI(x) : R → R be an
increasing function equal to 0 when x ≤ 0 and concave in the region x ≥ 0 (associated
with the investor utility function). Define v : M1(R) → R ∪ {∞} by the expected
uI-utility over a random variable distributed as f :
v(Ff ) =
∫ ∞
−∞
uI(x) dFf (x).
Let L be a negative real number. Define A ⊆M1(R) by
A =
{
Ff |
∫ ∞
−∞
uR(x) dFf (x) ≥ L
}
.
This is the set of distribution functions leading to an expected uR-utility larger than a
possible “loss” level L. It is worth mentioning that both the objective and the admissible
set are formulated in terms of expected utility functions.
The supremum for the optimization problem (5) can then be computed as follows.
Define q(x) = (1− F dQ
dP
)−1(x).
Given p ∈ [0, 1], define C1(p) ∈ R ∪ {−∞} to be the infimum of the optimization
problem
inf
f1:[0,p]→ (−∞,0), with f1 increasing
∫ p
0
f1(x)q(x)dx
subject to
∫ p
0
uR(f1(x)) dx ≥ L.
(14)
Define V (p) ∈ R ∪ {∞} to be the supremum of the optimization problem
sup
f2:[p,1]→[0,∞), with f2 increasing
∫ 1
p
uI(f2(x))dx
subject to
∫ 1
p
f2(x)q(x)dx ≤ C2.
(15)
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with C2(p) defined by
C2(p) := e
rTC − C1(p) (16)
(recall that C1 comes from the first problem above). Then the supremum of the problem
(5) is equal to supp∈[0,1] V (p).
Remark 6.2. The value of the theorem comes from the fact that the problems (14) and
(15) are easy to solve, see Lemma 6.5 below. One may then compute supp∈[0,1] V (p) by
line search. Moreover, it is simple to obtain an explicit solution of (5) given solutions
to each of these simpler problems. The risk constraint will typically be relevant, unlike
the case of expected shortfall.
Remark 6.3. Although we have specialised to the case of limited liability, note that
the strategies pursued by an investor with limited liability will be at least as aggressive
than those pursued by an investor with S-shaped utility. Thus if we can find bounds
for an investor with limited liability, we will obtain bounds for more general S-shaped
utilities. Finding explicit solutions to the problem (5) for general S-shaped utilities
would seem a rather more difficult problem.
Proof. By Theorem 3.1, the optimization problem 5 is equivalent to solving
sup
ϕ:[0,1]→R, with ϕ increasing
∫ 1
0
uI(ϕ(x)) dx
subject to
∫ 1
0
uR(ϕ(x)) dx ≥ L
and −∞ ≤
∫ 1
0
ϕ(x)q(x) dx ≤ erTC.
(17)
where q = (1− F dQ
dP
)−1 and so is decreasing with integral 1.
Since in problem (17) we require that ϕ is increasing, there is some p ∈ [0, 1] such
that ϕ(x) is less than 0 for x less than p and ϕ(x) is greater than 0 for x greater than
p. Since the value of the integrals in the optimization problems is unaffected by the
value of ϕ at the single point p, we may also assume that ϕ(p) = 0.
For a fixed p, we may define f1 to be the restriction of ϕ to [0, p] and f2 to be the
restriction of ϕ to [p, 1]. Let us write V˜ (p) ∈ R∪{±∞} for the value of the supremum
in the problem.
sup
f1:[0,p]→[−∞,0), with f1 increasing
f2:[p,1]→[0,∞), with f2 increasing
∫ 1
p
uI(f2(x)) dx
subject to
∫ p
0
uR(f1(x)) dx ≥ L
and −∞ ≤
∫ p
0
f1(x)q(x) +
∫ 1
p
f2(x)q(x) dx ≤ erTC.
We use the value −∞ to indicate that the constraints cannot be satisfied as is
conventional in convex analysis. The supremum of problem (17) and hence of (5) is
given by
sup
p∈[0,1]
V˜ (p).
It is obvious that V (p) = V˜ (p).
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The case when the supremum of the optimization problem (15) is equal to the
supremum of the investor’s utility function uI is rather uninteresting as the risk-
constraints clearly will play no role. This motivates the following definition.
Definition 6.4. In a given market, an investor with utility function uI is said to be
difficult to satisfy if the supremum of the optimization problem (15) is less then the
supremum of their utility function for any finite cost constraint C2 and any p ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 6.5. Let A and B be constants satisfying −∞ ≤ A < B ≤ ∞ and let a and b
be finite constants satisfying a < b. We will write I for the set of increasing functions
mapping [a, b] to [A,B].
Suppose that q : [a, b] → R is a positive decreasing function with finite integral.
Suppose that u is a concave increasing function. Let ∂u(x) be the set
∂u(x) = {y ∈ [0,∞) | ∀x′ ∈ [A,B], u(x′) ≤ u(x) + y(x′ − x)}.
Apart from at the boundary points {A,B}, this is the subdifferential of the concave
function u4. Let α be a constant and let ϕ? ∈ F satisfy
αq(x) ∈ ∂u(ϕ∗(x)) (18)
for every x. Then ϕ∗ is a solution to the maximization problem
sup
ϕ∈F
∫ b
a
u(ϕ(x)) dx
subject to
∫ b
a
ϕ(x)q(x) dx ≤
∫ b
a
ϕ∗(x)q(x) dx
(19)
and the minimization problem
inf
ϕ∈F
∫ b
a
ϕ(x)q(x) dx
subject to
∫ b
a
u(ϕ(x)) dx ≥
∫ b
a
u(ϕ∗(x)) dx.
(20)
Proof. Let ϕ : [a, b]→ [A,B] be another function. By the assumption (18) we have
u(ϕ(x)) ≤ u(ϕ∗(x)) + αq(x)(ϕ(x)− ϕ∗(x)).
Integrating this∫ b
a
u(ϕ(x)) dx ≤
∫ b
a
u(ϕ∗(x)) dx+ α
∫ b
a
q(x)(ϕ(x)− ϕ∗(x)) dx.
So if ϕ satisfies the constraints of (19) we conclude∫ b
a
u(ϕ(x))dx ≤
∫ b
a
u(ϕ∗(x)) dx.
Thus ϕ∗ solves the problem (19). Similarly ϕ∗ solves (20).
4See [23] for a discussion of subdifferentials. As remarked in [23] the term subdifferential is
used for both convex and concave functions even though superdifferential might be considered
a more apt term for concave functions.
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Remark 6.6. Lemma 6.5 can also be used to solve portfolio optimization problems of
the form (5) where the only constraints are bounds on the payoff function f . These
problems are considered in more detail in [13], with a greater emphasis on the unique-
ness of the solutions.
Continuing with the propositive part of the paper, we now compute the solution
of the problem in Theorem 6.1 in a specific case. The significance of this computation
is that it will allow us to immediately write down an upper bound on the solution of
the problem in 6.1 for many financially interesting cases.
Theorem 6.7. Let γR ∈ (1,∞) be given. Let
uR(x) =
{
−(−x)γR x ≤ 0
0 otherwise.
Suppose that we wish to solve the optimization problem of Theorem 6.1 and that uI
is such that the investor is difficult to satisfy. The risk constraint in Theorem 6.1 is
binding if and only if the expectation
EP
(
dQ
dP
γR
γR−1
)
is finite.
If the investor’s utility function is given by
uI(x) =
{
xγI x ≥ 0
0 otherwise
.
for γI ∈ (0, 1), then the investor is difficult to satisfy if the expectation
EP
(
dQ
dP
γI
γI−1
)
is finite.
Proof. In this case uR is smooth with derivative
u′R(x) = γR(−x)γR−1.
We define i1(y) = ((uR)
′)−1(y) : [0,∞)→ (−∞, 0]. So
i1(y) = −
(
y
γR
) 1
γR−1
.
Given α > 0 we define ϕ∗1,α(x) = i1(αq(x)). By Lemma 6.5, ϕ
∗
1,α is a solution of the
problem:
inf
ϕ∈F
∫ b
a
ϕ(x)q(x) dx
subject to
∫ b
a
uR(ϕ(x)) dx ≥ L(α, a, b).
(21)
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where 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1 and
L(α, a, b) :=
∫ b
a
uR(ϕ
∗
1,α(x))dx
= −
∫ b
a
((
αq(x)
γR
) 1
γR−1
)γR
dx
= −
(
α
γR
) γR
γR−1
∫ b
a
q(x)
γR
γR−1 dx.
The optimum value of (21) is given by
C1(α, a, b) :=
∫ b
a
q(x)i1(αq(x)) dx
=
∫ b
a
−q(x)
(
αq(x)
γR
) 1
−1+γR
dx
= −
(
α
γR
) 1
γR−1
∫ b
a
q(x)
γR
γR−1 dx.
Let us write
I1(a, b) :=
∫ b
a
q(x)
γR
γR−1 edx
To solve ensure L(α, a, b) = L we must take as α
α∗ = γ
( −L
I1(a, b)
) γR−1
γR
which we note is finite and is greater than 0 whenever I1(a, b) is finite.
We compute that
C1(α
∗, a, b) = −
( −L
I1(a, b)
) γR−1
γR
 1γR−1 I1(a, b)
= −(−L) 1γR I1(a, b)
γR−1
γR .
If I1(0, p) is finite it follows from Lemma 6.5 that the C1 of Theorem 6.1 takes the
value
C1(p) = −(−L)
1
γR I1(0, p)
γR−1
γR . (22)
If the investor is difficult to satisfy, it follows that the constraint is binding.
On the other hand if I1(0, p) is infinite, we may take ϕ1(x) = ϕ
∗
α∗(x)1[a,b](x) to find
a function satisfying the constraints of problem (14) with objective value C(α∗, a, b).
Since this tends to −∞ as a→ 0 we deduce that
C1(p) = −∞
if I1(0, p) is infinite. Since uI is increasing we can achieve arbitrary large utilities
below supuI given sufficient cash. Hence the constraint is not binding in this case.
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To determine when the investor is easily satisfied we solve the optimization problem
(15). We define
i2(y) := ((uI)
′)−1(y) =
(
y
γI
) 1
γI−1
.
We now define ϕ∗2,α = i2(α(q(x)) for α > 0.
By Lemma 6.5, ϕ∗2,α is a solution of the problem:
sup
ϕ∈F
∫ b
a
uI(ϕ(x)) dx
subject to
∫ b
a
ϕ(x)q(x) dx ≤ C2(α, a, b).
(23)
where 0 ≤ a < b ≤ 1 and
C2(α, a, b) :=
∫ b
a
ϕ∗2,α(x)q(x)dx
=
∫ b
a
(
αq(x)
γI
) 1
γI−1
q(x)dx
=
∫ b
a
(
α
γI
) 1
γI−1
q(x)
γI
γI−1 dx.
We define I2(a, b) =
∫ b
a
q(x)
γI
γI−1 dx so we have
C2(α, a, b) =
(
α
γI
) 1
γI−1
I2(a, b). (24)
The corresponding supremum of (23) is then given by
u(α, a, b) :=
∫ b
a
(
αq(x)
γI
) γI
γI−1
dx
=
(
α
γI
) γI
γI−1
I2(a, b)
=
(
C2(α, a, b)
I2(a, b)
)γI
I2(a, b)
= C2(α, a, b)
γI I2(a, b)
1−γI
(25)
We deduce that the investor is difficult to satisfy if and only if
I2(a, b)
is finite.
We now summarize the key findings of the paper in a single theorem.
Theorem 6.8. Suppose that (Ω,F ,P) and dQ
dP define a complete market. Define
e(γ) := EP
(
dQ
dP
γ
γ−1
)
. (26)
J. Armstrong & D. Brigo. Optimizing S-shaped utility & risk management 19
An investor with S-shaped utility function uI who is subject only to expected shortfall
constraints can find a sequence of portfolios satisfying these constraints whose expected
uI-utility tends to infinity. If in addition the investor is difficult to satisfy and uR is
the function
uR =
{
−(−x)γR x ≤ 0
0 otherwise
(27)
with γR > 1 and e(γR) finite, then any sequence of portfolios whose expected uI-utility
tends to infinity will have expected uR utility tending to −∞.
The conditions that e(γR) is finite and that the investor is difficult to satisfy are
always satisfied for the market of derivatives on the Black–Scholes–Merton market
described in Section 5 when the market price of risk is non-zero and the investor
utility function uI is not bounded above.
Proof. Apart from the assertions about the Black–Scholes–Merton market, the result
follows from Theorem 6.1, Theorem 4.1 and our formal definition of S-shaped utility.
In the Black–Scholes–Merton market, the expectation e(γ) is equal to
∫
R
(
qBSsT (x)
pBSsT (x)
) γ
γ−1
pBSsT (x) dx
where pBS and qBS are given by equations (12) and (13) respectively. On substituting
in these formulae for pBS and qBS one obtains
e(γ) =
∫
R
1
σ
√
2piT
exp
(
c0 + c1x+ c2x
2
8(γ − 1)σ2T
)
dx (28)
with
c0 = T
2 (−γσ4 + 4µ2 − 4µσ2 − 4γr2 + 4γrσ2 + σ4)
− 4s0T
(−γσ2 − 2µ+ 2γr + σ2)− 4(γ − 1)s20,
c1 = 4
(
T
(−γσ2 − 2µ+ 2γr + σ2)+ 2(γ − 1)s0) ,
c2 = 4− 4γ.
The overall coefficient of x2 in the exponential in our expression (28) for e(γ) is
4− 4γ
8(γ − 1)σ2T = −
1
2σ2T
.
This is always negative and so the expression (28) is a Gaussian integral and hence is
finite.
It now follows from Theorem 6.7 that since uI is risk-averse on the right and also
unbounded on the right that the investor is difficult to satisfy.
7 Conclusions
We have shown that in typical complete markets with non-zero market price of risk,
expected shortfall constraints do not affect the supremum of the investor utility that
can be achieved by an investor with S-shaped utility, uI . By contrast, even very
weak expected utility constraints for a concave increasing limiting utility function can
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reduce the supremum that can be achieved. In these circumstances, if a risk manager
with such a concave increasing utility function, uR, only imposes expected shortfall
constraints, they should expect that a rogue investor will choose investment strategies
with infinitely bad uR-utilities. These findings were stated in full detail in Theorem
6.8.
We believe that this shows that in complete markets value at risk or expected
shortfall constraints alone are insufficient to constrain the behaviour of rogue investors.
An obvious criticism of our approach is that the complete market assumption
is unrealistic. In many situations markets can be well approximated by complete
markets, but they are a mathematical idealisation. In particular, our result that the
strategies pursued are infinitely bad when measured using expected utilities will clearly
fail in realistic markets. One expects that in practice the infinitely bad expected uR-
utilities will merely be very bad utilities. We will investigate this question numerically
in future research.
Nevertheless, even if one believes that further research will reveal some features of
realistic market models that significantly blunt our findings, it surely behoves those
risk-managers who are willing to rely on expected shortfall constraints to explain
what these features are, and to demonstrate the effectiveness of their risk-management
constraints.
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Appendix
A Proof of Theorem 3.1
To prove Theorem 3.1, we define the notion of X-rearrangement.
Definition A.1. Given random variables X, f ∈ L0(Ω,R) with X having a continuous
distribution we define the X-rearrangement of f , denoted fX by:
fX(ω) = F−1f (P(X ≤ X(ω))) = F−1f (FX(X(ω))).
Lemma A.2. The X-rearrangement has the following properties:
(i) If X has a continuous probability distribution then fX is equal to f in distribu-
tion.
(ii) If k ∈ R then (max{f, k})X = max{fX , k} and (min{f, k})X = min{fX , k}
(iii) fX = (f+)X + (f−)X .
(iv) XX = X almost surely.
(v) If g(ω) = G(X(ω)) with G increasing and if X has a continuous probability
distribution then gX = g almost surely.
Proof of (i). We recall that: for any distribution function F with generalized inverse
F−1, F−1(p) ≤ x if and only if p ≤ F (x); FX ◦ F−1X = id if X has a continuous
distribution. Hence if X has a continuous distribution:
FfX (y) = P(f
X(ω) ≤ y)
= P(F−1f (P(X ≤ X(ω)) ≤ y)
= P(P(X ≤ X(ω)) ≤ Ff (y))
= P(FX(X(ω)) ≤ Ff (y))
= P(X(ω) ≤ F−1X Ff (y))
= FX(F
−1
X (Ff (y)))
= Ff (y).
Proof of (ii). The result follows from the definition of fX and the following identities:
F−1max{f,k}(t) = inf{z ∈ R : P(max{f, k} ≤ z) ≥ t}
= inf{z ∈ R : P(f ≤ z and k ≤ z) ≥ t}
= max{inf{z ∈ R : P(f ≤ z) ≥ t}, k}
= max{F−1f (t), k}.
F−1min{f,k}(p) = inf{z ∈ R : P(min{f, k} ≤ z) ≥ p}
= inf{z ∈ R : P(f ≤ z or k ≤ z) ≥ p}
= min{inf{z ∈ R : P(f ≤ z) ≥ p}, k}
= min{F−1f (p), k}.
J. Armstrong & D. Brigo. Optimizing S-shaped utility & risk management 23
Proof of (iii). We use (ii) to derive the following identity
F−1f (p) = (F
−1
f )
+(p) + (F−1f )
−(p)
= max{F−1f (p), 0}+ min{F−1f (p), 0}
= F−1max{f,0}(p) + F
−1
min{f,0}(p)
= F−1
f+
(t) + F−1
f− .
The result now follows from the definition of fX .
Proof of (iv). We wish to prove that the set
A = {W ∈ Ω : F−1X FXX(W ) 6= X(W )}
is null.
We recall that
F−1X FX(x) ≤ x and FXF−1X (p) ≥ p (29)
for all x ∈ R and p ∈ [0, 1]. We note that since FX is increasing this first inequality
implies that
FX(F
−1
X FX(x)) ≤ FX(x)
and the second implies
FXF
−1
X (FX(x)) ≥ FX(x).
We deduce
FXF
−1
X FX(x) = FX(x). (30)
Suppose that F−1X is continuous at FXX(W ) ∈ [0, 1] then
F−1X FXX(W ) = inf{F−1X (q) | q > FXX(W )}
= inf{inf{x | FX(x) ≥ q} | q > FXX(W )}
= inf{x | FX(x) > FXX(W )}
≥ X(W ).
But by (29), F−1X FXX(W ) ≤ X(W ) for all W ∈ Ω. So if F−1X is continuous at
FXX(W ) then F
−1
X FXX(W ) = X(W ), so W /∈ A. Let P denote the set of disconti-
nuities of F−1X . We have shown:
A ⊆
⋃
p∈P
{ω | F−1X FXX(ω) 6= X(ω) and FXX(ω) = p}.
Since F−1X is monotone, P is countable. Thus we can find a countable set {ω1, ω2, . . .}
of elements of Ω such that
A ⊆
⋃
ωi
{ω | F−1X FXX(ω) 6= X(ω) and FXX(ω) = FXX(ωi)}
=
⋃
ωi
{ω | F−1X FXX(ωi) 6= X(ω) and FXX(ω) = FXX(ωi)}
=
⋃
ωi
Ai
(31)
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where
Ai : = {ω | F−1X FXX(ωi) 6= X(ω) and FXX(ω) = FXX(ωi)}
= {ω | FXX(ω) = FXX(ωi)} \ {ω | F−1X FXX(ωi) = X(ω)}.
(32)
We now note that
{ω | FXX(ω) = FXX(ωi)} =
{ω | FXX(ω) ≤ FXX(ωi)} \ {ω | FXX(ω) < FXX(ωi)} (33)
and
{ω | F−1X FXX(ωi) = X(ω)} =
{ω | X(ω) ≤ F−1X FXX(ωi)} \ {ω | X(ω) < F−1X FXX(ωi)}. (34)
Now
X(ω) < F−1X FXX(ωi) =⇒ X(ω) < inf{x : FX(x) ≥ FXX(ωi)}
=⇒ FXX(ω) < FXX(ωi).
(35)
Conversely we can use (30) to see that
FXX(ω) < FxX(ωi) =⇒ FXX(ω) < FXF−1X FXX(ωi)
=⇒ X(ω) < F−1X FXX(ωi)
(36)
since FX is increasing. Together (35) and (36) imply
{ω | FXX(ω) < FXX(ωi)} = {ω | X(ω) < F−1X FXX(ωi)}. (37)
We use (33), (34) and (37) to rewrite (32) as
Ai = {ω | FXX(ω) ≤ FXX(ωi)} \ {ω | X(ω) ≤ F−1X FXX(ωi)}. (38)
Let Li = {ω | X(ω) ≤ F−1X FXX(ωi)}. We use (30) to compute that
P(ω ∈ Li) = FXF−1X FXX(ωi) = FXX(ωi). (39)
Let Ri = {ω ∈ Ω | FXX(ω) = FXX(ωi)}. We know Ri is non empty since it
contains ωi. Therefore we may choose a sequence v
j
i in Ri such that X(v
j
i ) is increasing
and has limit equal to supv∈Ri X(v). Moreover if this supremum is obtained we may
assume that the sequence X(vji ) obtains its limit.
{ω | FXX(ω) ≤ FXX(ωi)} =
⋃
x
{ω | X(ω) ≤ x and FX(x) ≤ FXX(ωj)}
=
⋃
j
{ω | X(ω) ≤ X(vji ) and FXX(vji ) ≤ FXX(ωj)}
=
⋃
j
{ω | X(ω) ≤ X(vji )}
=
⋃
j
V ji
(40)
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Where V ji := {ω | X(ω) ≤ X(vji )}. We now compute that
P(ω ∈ V ji ) = FXX(vji ) = FXX(ωi), (41)
since vji ∈ Ri.
Since F−1X FXX(ωi) = inf{X(ω) | ω ∈ Ri} ≤ X(vji ) we see that Li ⊆ V ji . Hence
P(ω ∈ V ji \ Li) = P(ω ∈ V ji )− P(ω ∈ Li) = 0, using (41) and (39). By (31), (38) and
(40) we have
A ⊆
⋃
i
⋃
j
(V ji \ Li).
So Ai is a countable union of null sets and hence is null.
Proof of (v). We define a generalized inverse for G by
G−1(y) = sup{x ∈ R | G(x) ≤ y}.
We define a function G˜ by
G˜(x) = inf{G(x′) | x′ ≥ x}.
We see that G˜(x) = G(x) except possibly at the discontinuities of G.
We note that
G˜(x) ≤ y ⇐⇒ inf{G(x′) | x′ ≥ x} ≤ y
⇐⇒ ∃x′ with G(x′) ≤ y and x′ ≥ x
⇐⇒ x ≤ sup{x′ | G(x′) ≤ y}
⇐⇒ x ≤ G−1(y).
(42)
We define g˜(ω) = G˜XX(ω). G is monotone so only has a countable number of
discontinuities. Let D denote the set of discontinuities of G. Then G˜(x) = G(x) unless
x ∈ D. So the set of ω for which g˜(ω) 6= g(ω) is contained in X−1(D) ∪ A where A
is the null set defined in (iv). By the continuity of the distribution of X, X−1(x) is a
null set for all x. Hence g˜ = g almost surely.
We now wish to calculate gX(W ) for W ∈ Ω. In the calculation below, W should
be thought of as fixed and ω should be thought of as a random scenario. So, for
example P(X(ω) ≤ X(W )) = FX(X(W )).
gX(W ) = F−1g (P(X(ω) ≤ X(W )))
= F−1g˜ (P(X(ω) ≤ X(W )))
= inf{x | Fg˜(x) ≥ P(X(ω) ≤ X(W ))}
= inf{x | FG˜X(x) ≥ P(X(ω) ≤ X(W ))}
= inf{x | P(G˜X(ω) ≤ x) ≥ P(X(ω) ≤ X(W ))}
= inf{x | P(X(ω) ≤ G−1x) ≥ P(X(ω) ≤ X(W ))} (by (42))
= inf{x | FX(G−1x) ≥ FX(X(W ))}
= inf{x | G−1x ≥ XX(W )}
= inf{x | XX(W ) ≤ G−1x} (by (42))
= inf{x | G˜(XX(W )) ≤ x}
= G˜XX(W )
= g˜(W ).
J. Armstrong & D. Brigo. Optimizing S-shaped utility & risk management 26
Hence gX = g almost surely.
Lemma A.3. If f, g ∈ L0(Ω;R) and:
(i) f(ω) ≥ k for some k ∈ R;
(ii) g ≥ 0;
(iii)
∫
Ω
g dP <∞ ;
(iv) X has a continuous distribution;
then ∫
Ω
fg dP ≤
∫
Ω
fXgX dP ≤ ∞.
Proof. (Note: this proof is modelled on the proof of the Hardy–Littlewood inequality
for “symmetric decreasing rearrangements”.)
Since f ≥ k we have the “layer-cake” representation of f
f(ω) = k +
∫ ∞
0
1L(f,x+k)(ω) dx
where
L(f, t) := {ω | f(ω) > t}.
We also have
g(ω) =
∫ ∞
0
1L(g,x)(ω) dx.
We note that for any random variable h
L(hX , x) = {ω | hX(ω) > x}
= {ω | F−1h (P(X ≤ X(ω)) > x}
= {ω | P(X ≤ X(ω)) > Fh(x)}.
Hence for any h1, h2, x1, x2 either
L(hX1 , x1) ⊆ L(hX2 , x2) or L(hX2 , x2) ⊆ L(hX1 , x1). (43)
We also note that
P(L(h, x)) = P(h(ω) > x) = 1− Fh(x).
In particular P(L(h, x)) only depends upon the distribution of h and hence P(L(hX , x)) =
P(L(h, x)) by Lemma A.2.
We now compute:
EP(1L(fX , x+ k)(ω)1L(gX , y)(ω)) = P(L(fX , (x+ k)) ∩ L(gX , y))
= min{P(L(fX , (x+ k))),P(L(gX , y))} by (43)
= min{P(L(f, (x+ k))),P(L(g, y))}
≥ P(L(f, (x+ k)) ∩ L(g, y))
= EP(1L(f, x+ k)(ω)1L(g, y)(ω)).
(44)
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Using the fact that f is bounded below and
∫
Ω
g dP <∞ we deduce that∫
Ω
(fg)− dP > −∞.
By Lemma A.2, fX is also bounded below and g = gX in distribution so
∫
Ω
gXdP <∞.
Hence ∫
Ω
(fXgX)− dP > −∞.
Therefore we may use the layer-cake representations of f , g, fX and gX together with
Fubini’s theorem and (44) to compute:∫
Ω
fg dP = k
∫
Ω
g dP+
∫
Ω
∫
R
∫
R
1L(f, x+ k)(ω)1L(g, y)(ω)dx dy dP
= k
∫
Ω
g dP+
∫
R
∫
R
∫
Ω
1L(f, x+ k)(ω)1L(g, y)(ω) dPdxdy
≤ k
∫
Ω
g dP+
∫
R
∫
R
∫
Ω
1L(f
X , x+ k)(ω)1L(g
X , y)(ω) dP dx dy
=
∫
Ω
fXgX dP.
Lemma A.4. If f, g ∈ L0(Ω;R) and:
(i)
∫
fg dP > −∞;
(ii) g ≥ 0;
(iii)
∫
Ω
g dP exists;
(iv) X has a continuous distribution;
then
−∞ <
∫
Ω
fg dP ≤
∫
Ω
fXgX dP ≤ ∞.
Proof. In this proof, given a real k and random variable f , we will write fk as an
abbreviation for the random variable max{f(ω), k}. Lemma A.2 tells us (fk)X =
(fX)k so we may write f
X
k without ambiguity.
We know
∫
(fg)−dP > −∞. Since g ≥ 0, (fg)− = f−g, hence ∫ f−g dP > −∞.
Also since g ≥ 0 we have for any k ∈ R
−∞ <
∫
Ω
f−g dP ≤
∫
Ω
f−k g dP
By Lemma A.3 we then have
−∞ <
∫
Ω
f−g dP ≤
∫
Ω
f−k g dP ≤
∫
Ω
(f−)Xk g
X dP for all k.
As k → −∞, f−k (ω) ↓ f−(ω) and (f−)Xk (ω) ↓ (f−)X(ω) for all ω. So by the
Montone Convergence Theorem
−∞ <
∫
Ω
f−g dP ≤
∫
Ω
(f−)XgX dP.
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Lemma A.3 also tells us that
0 ≤
∫
Ω
f+g dP ≤
∫
Ω
(f+)XgX dP.
Hence
−∞ <
∫
Ω
fg dP =
∫
Ω
(f+ + f−)g dP
≤
∫
Ω
((f+)X + (f−)X)gX dP
≤
∫
Ω
(f+ + f−)XgX dP
=
∫
Ω
fXgXdP ≤ ∞.
Lemma A.5. If (Ω,F ,P) is non-atomic and Q ∈ L0(Ω;R) is a random variable
on Ω, then there exists a uniform random variable X ∈ L0(Ω;R) such that Q(ω) =
F−1Q (X(ω)).
Proof. Sierpin´ski’s theorem on non-atomic measures tells us that for all 0 ≤ α ≤ 1
there is a measurable set E ⊆ Ω of measure α [24].
One deduces that there is a uniformly distributed random variable U on Ω. To
see this, first partition Ω into two subsets of measure 1
2
, we will call this partition
Level 1. We define a random variable X1 which is equal to
1
2
on the first subset of
Level 1 and equal to 1 on the second subset of Level 1. Inductively we partition each
subset of Level n into two equally sized subsets and define Xn by Xn−1 − 12n on the
first subsets and Xn−1 on the second subsets. The distribution function of Xn will
be a step function from 0 to 1 with 2n uniform steps. By construction, Xn(ω) is
decreasing for each ω ∈ Ω. Hence Xn converges pointwise, hence almost surely, hence
in distribution to some random variable X. Thus X must be uniformly distributed.
At each point x ∈ R where there is a discontinuity of FQ consider the set Ωx =
F−1Q (x). This set has non-zero measure FQ(x)− F−Q (x) where F−Q (x) is the left limit
of the distribution function at x. Note that FQ(x)−F−Q (x) = P(Q = x). Hence by the
above we can find a measurable function Ux on Ωx taking values uniformly between 0
and 1. Define a random variable X by
X(ω) =
{
FQ(Q(ω)) if FQ is continuous at Q(ω)
FQ(x)− Ux(ω)P(Q = x) if FQ is discontinuous at x = Q(ω).
Clearly Q(ω) = F−1Q (X(ω)). We must show that X is uniformly distributed, i.e. that
P (X ≤ p) = p for all p ∈ [0, 1].
Given p ∈ [0, 1] define p− = sup(ImFQ ∩ (−∞, p]) and p+ = inf(ImFQ ∩ [p,∞)).
We partition Ω into three sets A, B and C defined by
A = {ω | FQ(Q(ω)) ≤ p−}
B = {ω | p− < FQ(Q(ω)) ≤ p+}
C = {ω | p+ < FQ(Q(ω))}.
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For all ω, X(ω) ≤ FQ(Q(ω)). So if ω ∈ A, X(ω) ≤ FQ(Q(ω)) ≤ p− ≤ p. Hence
P(X ≤ p | A) = 1. (45)
If ω ∈ B then X(ω) = p+ − Ux(ω)(p+ − p−). So
P(X ≤ p | B) = p− p
−
p+ − p− . (46)
For all ω, X(ω) ≥ F−Q (Q(ω)). Since F−Q is a left limit, F−Q (Q(ω)) ≥ FQ(x) if
x ≤ Q(ω). If ω ∈ C then F−1Q (p+) < Q(ω). We deduce that if ω ∈ C then
X(ω) ≥ F−Q (Q(ω)) ≥ FQ(F−1Q (p+)) = p+ ≥ p.
We deduce that
P(X ≤ p | C) = P(X = p | C).
and moreover this probablity is equal to 0 unless p+ = p. We may assume that each
Ux takes values in (0, 1) so that X(ω) never equals p
+ unless we have that p+ = p−
and F is continuous at x = F−1p+. But in this case we find that P(x = p+) = P(Q =
x) = P(Q ≤ x)− P(Q < x) = FQ(x)− F−Q (x) = 0. So P(x = p+) = 0 and hence
P(X(ω) ≤ p | C) = 0. (47)
Since p± ∈ ImFQ we compute that
P(FQ(Q(ω)) ≤ p±) = P(Q(ω) ≤ F−1Q (p±)) = FQ(F−1Q (p±))) = p±.
It follows that
P(A) = p−, P (A ∪B) = p+, hence P (B) = p+ − p−. (48)
Since A, B and C give a partition of Ω we may combine equations (45), (46), (47) and
(48) to obtain
P(X(ω) ≤ p) = p.
So X is uniformly distributed as claimed.
Proof of Theorem 3.1. Take Q to be dQ
dP in Lemma A.5 to find X uniformly distributed
with dQ
dP = F
−1
dQ
dP
V almost surely.
Suppose f satisfies the constraints of (5). We see that −(−f)X is equal to f in
distribution, hence −(−f)X ∈ A if f ∈ A. Furthermore
−erTC ≤
∫
Ω
(−f)dQ
dP
dP by (5),
≤
∫
Ω
(−f)X
(
dQ
dP
)X
dP by Lemma A.4,
=
∫
Ω
(−f)X dQ
dP
dP ≤ ∞ by Lemma A.2.
So −(−f)X satisfies the constraints of (5).
Finally we note that
−(−f)X(ω) = −F−1−f FXX(ω) = −F−1−fX(ω) = (1− Ff )−1X(ω).
The result now follows by taking U = 1−X.
